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The Scientific World Journal
Volume 2014, Article ID 825072, 11 pages
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/825072
Research Article

Password-Only Authenticated Three-Party Key Exchange with Provable Security in the Standard Model

1Department of Computer Engineering, Konkuk University, 268 Chungwondaero, Chungju, Chungcheongbukdo 380-701, Republic of Korea
2Information Assurance Research Group, Advanced Computing Research Centre, University of South Australia, Mawson Lakes, SA 5095, Australia
3Department of Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, 2066 Seoburo, Suwon, Gyeonggido 440-746, Republic of Korea

Received 23 January 2014; Accepted 27 February 2014; Published 14 April 2014

Academic Editors: T. Cao, M. Ivanovic, and F. Yu

Copyright © 2014 Junghyun Nam et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Abstract

Protocols for password-only authenticated key exchange (PAKE) in the three-party setting allow two clients registered with the same authentication server to derive a common secret key from their individual password shared with the server. Existing three-party PAKE protocols were proven secure under the assumption of the existence of random oracles or in a model that does not consider insider attacks. Therefore, these protocols may turn out to be insecure when the random oracle is instantiated with a particular hash function or an insider attack is mounted against the partner client. The contribution of this paper is to present the first three-party PAKE protocol whose security is proven without any idealized assumptions in a model that captures insider attacks. The proof model we use is a variant of the indistinguishability-based model of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (2000), which is one of the most widely accepted models for security analysis of password-based key exchange protocols. We demonstrated that our protocol achieves not only the typical indistinguishability-based security of session keys but also the password security against undetectable online dictionary attacks.