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| S. no. | Schemes | Significance | Pros | Cons |
|
| 1 | SEF | (i) Nonoverlapping key partition
(ii) Bloom filter for reducing overhead | (i) Supports dynamic topology
(ii) Easy to apply | (i) threshold limitation
(ii) Does not work with the compromised partition |
|
| 2 | IHA | (i) Hop-by-hop authentication
(ii) Pairwise key establishment | (i) Works on node failure
(ii) Path-based filtering | (i) Maintenance cost is high
(ii) Path dependency |
|
| 3 | STEF | (i) Query-based approach
(ii) Verification based on tickets | (i) Verify the report validity
(ii) Only ticket holders forward the report | (i) The unnecessary dropping of reports due to route failure |
|
| 4 | BECAN | (i) CNR-based authentication
(ii) Bit-compressed scheme | (i) Key independency
(ii) Ensures reliability | (i) Need prior knowledge about nodes in the path
(ii) Communication overhead |
|
| 5 | CCEF | (i) Cipher-based authentication
(ii) Secure query/response session | (i) Works for dynamic networks
(ii) No threshold limitation | (i) Poor filtering
(ii) Need extra care for report dissemination |
|
| 6 | CAEFS | (i) Integrated with all the other schemes to provide security
(ii) Context-aware approach | (i) Compromised node isolation
(ii) Resiliency | (i) Energy consumption is high |
|
| 7 | ERF | (i) Extension for CCEF
(ii) Path creation based on distance | (i) Key dissemination only to an intermediate node
(ii) Extends the lifetime of the nodes | (i) Need extra care for report dissemination
(ii) CH requires prior knowledge of path and keys |
|
| 8 | MIHA | (i) Multipath authentication
(ii) Keys are derived using a hash function | (i) Works for disjoint/braided path
(ii) Route switching by the sink | (i) Node exploitation due to multiple paths
(ii) Consumes more energy |
|
| 9 | DEF | (i) Uses hill climbing approach for key distribution
(ii) Cluster-based approach | (i) Works independently on dissemination
(ii) Suitable for dynamic topology | (i) Utilize more energy
(ii) Report delays |
|
| 10 | LEDS | (i) Location-based filtering scheme
(ii) A symmetric key approach for filtering | (i) No threshold limitation
(ii) Provides E2E security | (i) Need location-aware key
(ii) Relies on a path for report forwarding |
|
| 11 | GRPEF | (i) Location-based filtering scheme
(ii) Key derivation using a multiaxis approach | (i) Supports sink mobility
(ii) No threshold limitation | (i) Localization is complex
(ii) Utilize more energy |
|
| 12 | AEF | (i) Based on a fitness function
(ii) Provides security with a minimal number of nodes | (i) Energy-aware scheme
(ii) Address dynamic query | (i) No key independency |
|
| 13 | NFFS | (i) Position-based filtering scheme
(ii) Decides whether the report generating nodes are logical | (i) No threshold limitation
(ii) Provides energy efficiency | (i) Not for dynamic networks |
|
| 14 | PCREF | (i) Uses MAP
(ii) Cluster-based approach | (i) Does not have a fixed path
(ii) Cluster-based approach | (i) threshold limitation
(ii) Storage overhead |
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| 15 | KAEF | (i) One-way authentication
(ii) Verification based on stored information | (i) New keys for every session
(ii) The hash function for chain maintenance | (i) Need for key reinitiation |
|
| 16 | TICK | (i) Time-based filtering scheme
(ii) Key generation based on clock function | (i) No need for a key exchange | (i) Not for an uncontrolled environment |
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