Secure Message Transmission for V2V Based on Mutual Authentication for VANETs

Table 1

Summary of previous authentication schemes.

Paper	Cryptography technique	Advantage	Disadvantage
Xu et al. [22]	One-way hash function h(.) XOR (MD5)	Achieve lightweight certification; reduce storage and computation cost; less storage space; resist against impersonation, modification, and replay assaults	Does not resist reaming internal and external assaults such as DoS and man-in-the-middle, respectively
Vijayakumar et al. [23]	Hash code; Finger print	Provide security to the vehicle and preventing unauthorized users, DKM for the user; unauthorized user does not enter the network; resist against replay, masquerading, Sybil, and message alteration assaults	Does not protect the vehicle location privacy
Kumari et al. [25]	One-way hash function; XOR operation	Fast authentication process; low computational load; protect against impersonation, stolen verifier, modification, replay, and insider assaults	Computation cost and storage costs are missing
Hakeem et al. [26]	Hash chain key generation; Elliptic curve	Enhances security level to protect anonymous identities; communication overhead is compared to previous protocols; reduces the message communication cost and computation time; protects DoS, man-in-the-middle, modification, and replay assaults	Storage cost is missing
Chaudhry [27]	Symmetric lightweight hash functions and encryption	Provides sufficient security; provide SEMP-IoV best security requirement of the fast mobility vehicle IoV scenario; protects stolen verifier, denial of services, replay, RSU impersonation, mutual authentication, and session key security; authentication process takes 0.198 ms	Storage cost is missing
Wang et al. [28]	Elliptic curve cryptosystem	Protects session key exposure, forward scary assaults; low computation cost	Storage cost is missing; DoS and Sybil assaults were missing in formal analysis
Tangade and Manvi [29]	ID-based signatures; HMAC techniques	Detection of malicious nodes; the integrity of the message is maintained; the proposed protocol fulfills the security requirements such as confidentiality, authenticity, and availability	Does not provide formal security analysis and lacks explanation of computation and communication costs
Limbasiya and Das [16]	One-way hash functions; Bitwise XOR operation; Low-cost cryptographic functions	Protects various assaults such as modification assault, man-in-the-middle assault, impersonation assault, concatenation, replay assault, stolen OBU, and password guessing assault	Formal security analysis is missing; computation cost and communication costs are missing
Zhou et al. [30]	Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem	Resists internal assaults; low computation cost; secures the identity of driver and location privacy, and only authentication users get it	Storage cost is missing; does not discuss DoS and Sybil attacks
Wu et al. [31]	Hash functions; XOR operation; Elliptic curve encryption	Improves weaknesses of Zhou et al.’s security scheme such as guessing assaults and impersonation assaults	Computation and storages cost are missing