Research Article

Provably Secure Client-Server Key Management Scheme in 5G Networks

Table 2

Cryptographic techniques and limitations.

SchemeCryptographic techniquesLimitations

Ying and Nayak [10](i) Utilized ECC
(ii) Utilized a self-certified public key
(iii) Based on the Diffie–Hellman problem
(i) Does not provide untraceability
(ii) Does not provide two-factor security
(iii) Does not resist offline identity guessing attacks
(iv) Does not resist offline password guessing attacks
(v) Does not resist user impersonation attacks
Yoon and Yoo [25](i) Based on biometrics
(ii) Utilized ECC
(iii) Based on a smart card
(i) Does not resist offline password guessing attacks
Liao and Hsiao [26](i) Based on bilinear pairings
(ii) Utilized a self-certified public key
(iii) Based on the Diffie–Hellman problem
(i) Does not resist tracking attacks
(ii) Does not provide preverification
Chuang and Chen [29](i) Utilized a one-way hash function
(ii) Based on biometrics
(iii) Based on a smart card
(i) Does not resist impersonation attacks
(ii) Does not resist smart card stolen attacks
(iii) Does not resist denial of service attacks
Mishra et al. [30](i) Utilized a one-way hash function
(ii) Based on biometrics
(iii) Based on a smart card
(i) Does not resist server impersonation attacks
(ii) Does not provide perfect forward security
He et al. [32](i) Based on bilinear pairings
(ii) Utilized a self-certified public key
(iii) Based on the Diffie–Hellman problem
(i) Does not resist offline password guessing attacks
(ii) Does not resist impersonation attacks
Li et al. [33](i) Based on bilinear pairings
(ii) Based on the Diffie–Hellman problem
(iii) Utilized a one-way hash function
Chuang and Tseng [34](i) Based on bilinear pairings
(ii) Based on the Diffie–Hellman problem
(iii) Utilized a one-way hash function
Tseng et al. [35](i) Based on bilinear pairings
(ii) Based on the Diffie–Hellman problem
(iii) Utilized a one-way hash function