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Algorithms | Designing goal | Advantages | Disadvantages | Scalability |
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PoW [44, 51] | Sybil-proof | (i) Security improvements (ii) Minimize the attacks up to 50% or less [52] | (i) More power consumption (ii) Centralized miners | Strong |
PoS [53] | Energy efficiency | (i) Energy efficient (ii) More decentralized | (i) Nothing-at-stake problem | Strong |
DPoS [53] | Organize PoS effectively | (i) Energy efficient (ii) Scalable (iii) Increased security | (i) Partially centralized (ii) Double spend attack | Strong |
LPoS [54] | Distributed PoS | (i) Fair usage (ii) Lease coins | (i) Decentralization issue | Strong |
PoA [29] | Benefits of both Pos and PoW | (i) Reduces the probability of the 51% attack (ii) Equal contribution | (i) Greater energy consumption (ii) Double signing | Strong |
PoL [54] | Improve PoS | (i) Vesting (ii) Transaction partnership | (i) Decentralization issue | Strong |
PoC [13] | Less energy than PoW | (i) Cheap (ii) Efficient (iii) Distributed | (i) Favoring bigger fishes (ii) Decentralization issue | Strong |
PoET [55] | Decide the mining rights | (i) Cheap participation | (i) Need for specialized hardware (ii) Not good for public blockchain | Low |
DAG [44, 56] | Speed and scalability | (i) Low-cost network (ii) Scalability | (i) Implementation gaps (ii) Not suited for smart contracts | Strong |
BFT [30] | Failures of system | (i) Energy efficiency (ii) Transaction finality | (i) Number of replicas in the network (ii) Message complexity | Low |
PBFT [30] | Remove software errors | (i) No need for confirmation (ii) Reduction in energy | (i) Communication gap (ii) Sybil attack | Low |
DBFT [30] | Faster PBFT | (i) Scalable (ii) Fast | (i) Conflictions in the chain | Medium |
Sumeragi [57] | Reputation system. | (i) Distributed across many clusters | (i) The more nodes that exist on the network, the more time it takes to reach consensus | Medium |
Ripple [58] | Same FBFT | (i) Reduce the latency | (i) Few nodes required to vote, not really distributed network | Strong |
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