Multiagent Collaborative Governance for Targeted Poverty Alleviation from the Perspective of Stakeholders

Table 5

Related data statistics in X country, Xinjiang (ten thousand RMB).

Parameters	Implications	Value
	The support provided by the superior government when the local government is active in poverty alleviation	1,200
	The cost local governments need to pay in the process of targeted poverty alleviation	560
	The external benefits brought by local governments due to poverty alleviation when the three parties are active in poverty alleviation	890
	The loss of opportunity costs when local governments are active in poverty alleviation but other players do not cooperate	650
	The basic benefits of targeted poverty alleviation when social organizations choose cooperative strategies	100
	The cost of cooperation among social organizations in the process of targeted poverty alleviation	450
	The support given by local governments to social organizations in choosing cooperative strategies	300
	Negative returns caused by social organizations to choose the strategy of noncooperative strategy	20
	The basic benefits of targeted poverty alleviation when poverty groups choose cooperative strategies	200
	The cost of cooperation among poverty groups in the process of targeted poverty alleviation	1100
	The support given by local governments to poverty groups in choosing cooperative strategies	400
	The support given by social organizations to poverty groups in choosing cooperative strategies	300
	The negative return caused by the poverty group chooses not to cooperate the strategy	200

Data source: the third party assessment questionnaire data statistics in Xinjiang targeted poverty alleviation in 2018.