Preference for Efficiency or Confusion? A Note on a Boundedly Rational Equilibrium Approach to Individual Contributions in a Public Good Game

Table 2

Homogeneous population (last rounds).

	Data	CFS	(1)	(2)	(3)
		—		11.63	26.91
		0.59	0.59	0.59	0
(Predicted) avg. contributions
Overall endowments	25.94	26.39	26.91	44.78	25.94
	21.13	17.59	18.44	34.55	25.05
	17.63	23.46	24.04	41.68	26.01
	35.28	29.32	29.71	48.30	26.30
	29.70	35.19	35.45	54.60	26.39
			−1675.03	−987.54	−885.62
Obs.	240	240	240	240	240

This table reports average contributions as well as estimates and predictions from various specifications of the model based on the efficiency concerns assumption using the last 5 rounds of the experiment only. The same remarks as in Table 1 apply.