The Reward-Penalty Mechanism in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information of the Third-Party Collector

Table 2

Notations.

Symbol	Description
Decision variables
	Collection price when the collector chooses contract , but the real collection effort level is ,
	Buy-back price when the collector chooses contract ,
	Franchise fee when the collector chooses contract ,
Parameters
	Manufacturer’s production cost of using new components and materials
	Manufacturer’s production cost of using recycled components
	Unit saved cost,
	Collection effort level of the third-party collector, ,
	The reward-penalty intensity,
	The target collection quantity
	The probability of third-party collector who adopts ,
	The reserved profit
	Unit retail price
Derived functions
	The expected profit of manufacturer when collector chooses contract ,
	The expected profit of type collector choosing contract ,
	Collection quantity of type collector choosing contract ,
	Information screening contract, i.e.,
Indexes
Subscript	The type of high collection effort level
Subscript	The type of low collection effort level
Superscript and	The optimal decision