The Reward-Penalty Mechanism in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information of the Third-Party Collector

Table 3

The optimal decisions of Case 1 with different .

	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9
	33.913	33.913	33.913	33.913	33.913	33.913	33.913	33.913	33.913
	35.754	35.609	35.422	35.174	34.826	34.304	33.435	31.696	26.478
	203.457	203.675	203.954	204.327	204.849	205.631	206.936	209.544	217.370
	244.718	241.626	237.665	232.410	225.106	214.263	196.493	162.089	67.949
	11.957	11.957	11.957	11.957	11.957	11.957	11.957	11.957	11.957
	14.377	14.304	14.211	14.087	13.913	13.652	13.217	12.348	9.739
	21.957	21.957	21.957	21.957	21.957	21.957	21.957	21.957	21.957
	21.377	21.304	21.211	21.087	20.913	20.652	20.217	19.348	16.739
	697.500	697.717	697.997	698.370	698.891	699.674	700.978	703.587	711.413
	698.784	698.745	698.650	698.446	698.011	697.033	694.533	686.272	635.402
	253.630	253.413	253.134	252.761	252.239	251.457	250.152	247.544	239.717
	200.000	200.000	200.000	200.000	200.000	200.000	200.000	200.000	200.000